One-Sided Matching with Dynamic Preferences

One-sided matching is concerned with the allocation of indivisible objects to a set of agents, in the absence of monetary transfers. In contrast to many real-life scenarios such as shift scheduling or course assignment, traditional matching mechanisms assume that agents precisely know their preferences. However, preferences over alternatives may change over time due to idiosyncratic reasons or as a function of earlier outcomes. My research focuses on the theoretical investigation of dynamic matching markets, along with the experimental study of various matching mechanisms in such dynamic environments. In particular, I design and analyze truthful sequential mechanisms in settings with dynamic ordinal preferences to further elucidate a principled approach to decision making in dynamic models of resource allocation and fill the current gap between stochastic reasoning models and the game-theoretical elements of the matching theory. Categories and Subject Descriptors I.2.11 [Distributed ...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2015
• Where: ATAL
• Authors: Hadi Hosseini
• Keywords: ATAL 2015, Intelligent Agents