Trojan Detection using IC Fingerprinting

Hardware manufacturers are increasingly outsourcing their IC fabrication work overseas due to much lower costs. This poses a significant security risk for ICs used for critical military and business applications. Attackers can exploit this loss of control to substitute Trojan ICs for genuine ones or insert a Trojan circuit into the design or mask used for fabrication. We show that a technique borrowed from sidechannel cryptanalysis can be used to mitigate this problem. Our approach uses noise modeling, to construct a set of fingerprints for an IC family utilizing side-channel information such as power, temperature, and electromagnetic (EM) profiles. The set of fingerprints can be developed using a few ICs from a batch and only these ICs would have to be invasively tested to ensure that they were all authentic. The remaining ICs are verified using statistical tests against the fingerprints. We describe the theoretical framework and present preliminary experimental results to show...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2007
• Where: SP
• Authors: Dakshi Agrawal, Selçuk Baktir, Deniz Karakoyunlu, Pankaj Rohatgi, Berk Sunar
• Keywords: Complex Ics, IC Fabrication Work, Security Privacy, SP 2007, Trojan ICs