ARMOR Security for Los Angeles International Airport

Security at major locations of economic or political importance is a key concern around the world, particularly given the threat of terrorism. Limited security resources prevent full security coverage at all times, which allows adversaries to observe and exploit patterns in selective patrolling or monitoring, e.g. they can plan an attack avoiding existing patrols. Hence, randomized patrolling or monitoring is important, but randomization must provide distinct weights to different actions based on their complex costs and benefits. To this end, this demonstration showcases a promising transition of the latest in multi-agent algorithms into a deployed application. In particular, it exhibits a software assistant agent called ARMOR (Assistant for Randomized Monitoring over Routes) that casts this patrolling/monitoring problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game, allowing the agent to appropriately weigh the different actions in randomization, as well as uncertainty over adversary types. ARMOR c...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2008
• Where: AAAI
• Authors: James Pita, Manish Jain, Fernando Ordóñez, Christopher Portway, Milind Tambe, Craig Western, Praveen Paruchuri, Sarit Kraus
• Keywords: AAAI 2008, Agent Called Armor, Bayesian Stackelberg Games, Intelligent Agents, Strategies Enable Randomization