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ECAI
2008
Springer

Coalition Structures in Weighted Voting Games

9 years 5 days ago
Coalition Structures in Weighted Voting Games
Abstract. Weighted voting games are a popular model of collaboration in multiagent systems. In such games, each agent has a weight (intuitively corresponding to resources he can contribute), and a coalition of agents wins if its total weight meets or exceeds a given threshold. Even though coalitional stability in such games is important, existing research has nonetheless only considered the stability of the grand coalition. In this paper, we introduce a model for weighted voting games with coalition structures. This is a natural extension in the context of multiagent systems, as several groups of agents may be simultaneously at work, each serving a different task. We then proceed to study stability in this context. First, we define the CS-core, a notion of the core for such settings, discuss its non-emptiness, and relate it to the traditional notion of the core in weighted voting games. We then investigate its computational properties. We show that, in contrast with the traditional set...
Edith Elkind, Georgios Chalkiadakis, Nicholas R. J
Added 19 Oct 2010
Updated 19 Oct 2010
Type Conference
Year 2008
Where ECAI
Authors Edith Elkind, Georgios Chalkiadakis, Nicholas R. Jennings
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