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ATAL
2008
Springer

Divide and conquer: false-name manipulations in weighted voting games

9 years 10 days ago
Divide and conquer: false-name manipulations in weighted voting games
In this paper, we study false-name manipulations in weighted voting games. Weighted voting is a well-known model of cooperation among agents in decision-making domains. In such games, each of the players has a weight, and a coalition of players wins the game if its total weight exceeds a certain quota. While a player's ability to influence the outcome of the game is related to its weight, it is not always directly proportional to it. This observation has led to the concept of a power index, which is a measure of an agent's "real power" in this domain. One prominent power index is the Shapley
Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind
Added 12 Oct 2010
Updated 12 Oct 2010
Type Conference
Year 2008
Where ATAL
Authors Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind
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