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AI
2006
Springer

Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions

9 years 12 months ago
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can accomplish them more efficiently. Motivating the agents to abide by a solution requires careful analysis: only some of the solutions are stable in the sense that no group of agents is motivated to break off and form a new coalition. This constraint has been studied extensively in cooperative game theory: the set of solutions that satisfy it is known as the core. The computational questions around the core have received less attention. When it comes to coalition formation among software agents (that represent real-world parties), these questions become increasingly explicit. In this paper we define a concise, natural, general representation for games in characteristic form that relies on superadditivity. In our representation, individual agents' values are given...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
Added 10 Dec 2010
Updated 10 Dec 2010
Type Journal
Year 2006
Where AI
Authors Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
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