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JAIR
2008

Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections

8 years 3 months ago
Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections
Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no specific attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple winners, e.g., elections of an assembly or committee. In this paper, we characterize the worst-case complexity of manipulation and control in the context of four prominent multiwinner voting systems, under different formulations of the strategic agent's goal.
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens
Added 12 Dec 2010
Updated 12 Dec 2010
Type Journal
Year 2008
Where JAIR
Authors Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Aviv Zohar
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