A broader picture of the complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections

Recent work by Procaccia, Rosenschein and Zohar [14] established some results regarding the complexity of manipulation and control in elections with multiple winners, such as elections of an assembly or committee; that work provided an initial understanding of the topic. In this paper, we paint a more complete picture of the topic, investigating four prominent multi-winner voting rules. First, we characterize the complexity of manipulation and control in these voting rules under various kinds of formalizations of the manipulator's goal. Second, we extend the results about complexity of control to various well-known types of control. This work enhances our comprehension of which multi-winner voting rules should be employed in various settings. Categories and Subject Descriptors F.2 [Theory of Computation]: Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity; I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial Intelligence--Multiagent Systems; J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2008
• Where: ATAL
• Authors: Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
• Keywords: ATAL 2008, Intelligent Agents, Multi-winner Voting Rules, Prominent Multi-winner Voting, Voting Rules