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TARK
2007
Springer

The computational complexity of choice sets

10 years 3 months ago
The computational complexity of choice sets
Social choice rules are often evaluated and compared by inquiring whether they fulfill certain desirable criteria such as the Condorcet criterion, which states that an alternative should always be chosen when more than half of the voters prefer it over any other alternative. Many of these criteria can be formulated in terms of choice sets that single out reasonable alternatives based on the preferences of the voters. In this paper, we consider choice sets whose definition merely relies on the pairwise majority relation. These sets include the Copeland set, the Smith set, the Schwartz set, and von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets (a concept originally introduced in the context of cooperative game theory). We investigate the relationships between these sets and completely characterize their computational complexity. This allows us to obtain hardness results for entire classes of social choice functions.
Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein
Added 09 Jun 2010
Updated 09 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2007
Where TARK
Authors Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein
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