Correcting errors without leaking partial information

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Correcting errors without leaking partial information
This paper explores what kinds of information two parties must communicate in order to correct errors which occur in a shared secret string W. Any bits they communicate must leak a significant amount of information about W -- that is, from the adversary's point of view, the entropy of W will drop significantly. Nevertheless, we construct schemes with which Alice and Bob can prevent an adversary from learning any useful information about W. Specifically, if the entropy of W is sufficiently high, then there is no function f(W) which the adversary can learn from the error-correction information with significant probability. This leads to several new results: (a) the design of noise-tolerant "perfectly oneway" hash functions in the sense of Canetti et al. [7], which in turn leads to obfuscation of proximity queries for high entropy secrets W; (b) private fuzzy extractors [11], which allow one to extract uniformly random bits from noisy and nonuniform data W, while also insu...
Yevgeniy Dodis, Adam Smith
Added 03 Dec 2009
Updated 03 Dec 2009
Type Conference
Year 2005
Where STOC
Authors Yevgeniy Dodis, Adam Smith
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