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8

ISAAC
2005
Springer

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Counting Stable Strategies in Random Evolutionary Games

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Counting Stable Strategies in Random Evolutionary Games

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In this paper we study the notion of the Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) in evolutionary games and we demonstrate their qualitative diﬀerence from the Nash Equilibria, by showing that a random evolutionary game has on average exponentially less number of ESS than the number of Nash Equilibria in the underlying symmetric 2-person game with random payoﬀs.

Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Paul G. Spirakis

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Added	27 Jun 2010
Updated	27 Jun 2010
Type	Conference
Year	2005
Where	ISAAC
Authors	Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Paul G. Spirakis

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