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SIGECOM
2006
ACM

Networks preserving evolutionary equilibria and the power of randomization

12 years 3 months ago
Networks preserving evolutionary equilibria and the power of randomization
We study a natural extension of classical evolutionary game theory to a setting in which pairwise interactions are restricted to the edges of an undirected graph or network. We generalize the definition of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), and show a pair of complementary results that exhibit the power of randomization in our setting: subject to degree or edge density conditions, the classical ESS of any game are preserved when the graph is chosen randomly and the mutation set is chosen adversarially, or when the graph is chosen adversarially and the mutation set is chosen randomly. We examine natural strengthenings of our generalized ESS definition, and show that similarly strong results are not possible for them. Categories and Subject Descriptors J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics General Terms Economics, Theory Keywords Game Theory, Evolutionary Stable Strategy, Networks
Michael S. Kearns, Siddharth Suri
Added 14 Jun 2010
Updated 14 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2006
Where SIGECOM
Authors Michael S. Kearns, Siddharth Suri
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