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WINET
2016

Designing differentially private spectrum auction mechanisms

2 years 11 months ago
Designing differentially private spectrum auction mechanisms
It is urgent to solve the contradiction between limited spectrum resources and the increasing demand from the ever-growing wireless networks. Spectrum redistribution is a powerful way to mitigate the situation of spectrum scarcity.In contrast to existing mechanisms for spectrum redistribution, which aim to maximize the spectrum utilization and social welfare, we propose DIARY in this paper, which not only achieves approximate revenue maximization, but also guarantees bid privacy via differential privacy. Furthermore, we present an effective method to address the fairness issue in spectrum auctions. Results from extensive evaluations show that DIARY has substantial competitive advantages over existing mechanisms. Keywords Mechanism design Á Differential privacy Á Fairness Á Resource allocation
Chunchun Wu, Zuying Wei, Fan Wu, Guihai Chen, Shao
Added 11 Apr 2016
Updated 11 Apr 2016
Type Journal
Year 2016
Where WINET
Authors Chunchun Wu, Zuying Wei, Fan Wu, Guihai Chen, Shaojie Tang
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