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FC
2006
Springer

Efficient Correlated Action Selection

13 years 8 months ago
Efficient Correlated Action Selection
Abstract. Participants in e-commerce and other forms of online collaborations tend to be selfish and rational, and therefore game theory has been recognized as particularly relevant to this area. In many common games, the joint strategy of the players is described by a list of pairs of actions, and one of those pairs is chosen according to a specified correlated probability distribution. In traditional game theory, a trusted third party mediator carries out this random selection, and reveals to each player its recommended action.In such games that have a correlated equilibrium, each player follows the mediator's recommendation because deviating from it cannot increase a player's expected payoff. Dodis, Halevi, and Rabin [1] described a two-party protocol that eliminates, through cryptographic means, the third party mediator. That protocol was designed and works well for a uniform distribution, but can be quite inefficient if applied to non-uniform distributions. Teague [2] ha...
Mikhail J. Atallah, Marina Blanton, Keith B. Frikk
Added 22 Aug 2010
Updated 22 Aug 2010
Type Conference
Year 2006
Where FC
Authors Mikhail J. Atallah, Marina Blanton, Keith B. Frikken, Jiangtao Li
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