Sciweavers

Share
ACSC
2004
IEEE

On Evolving Fixed Pattern Strategies for Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

9 years 9 months ago
On Evolving Fixed Pattern Strategies for Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Table 1 shows the payoff to player one. The same matrix also holds for player two. Player one can gain the maximum 5 points (T = 5) by defection if player two cooperates. However, if both players defect in the light of maximum profit, both players can only gain 1 point (P =1), which is less than 3 points (R =3) if both cooperated. This paper describes the social evolution of an environment where all individuals are repeating patterns of behaviour. The paper follows Axelrod's work [1] of computer simulations of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), which is widely regarded as a standard model for the evolution of cooperation. Previous studies by Axelrod [2], Hirshleifer and Coll [3], Lindgren [4], Fogel [5], Darwen and Yao [6] focused on strategies that are history dependent. In other words, these strategies use the outcome of the opponent's past game history in making a decision on a given move. This includes the most well-known strategy, tit-for-tat. This is an intere...
Daniel Jang, Peter A. Whigham, Grant Dick
Added 20 Aug 2010
Updated 20 Aug 2010
Type Conference
Year 2004
Where ACSC
Authors Daniel Jang, Peter A. Whigham, Grant Dick
Comments (0)
books