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CORR
2006
Springer

Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover

8 years 4 months ago
Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover
In set-system auctions, there are several overlapping teams of agents, and a task that can be completed by any of these teams. The auctioneer's goal is to hire a team and pay as little as possible. Examples of this setting include shortest-path auctions and vertex-cover auctions. Recently, Karlin, Kempe and Tamir introduced a new definition of frugality ratio for this problem. Informally, the "frugality ratio" is the ratio of the total payment of a mechanism to a desired payment bound. The ratio captures the extent to which the mechanism overpays, relative to perceived fair cost in a truthful auction. In this paper, we propose a new truthful polynomial-time auction for the vertex cover problem and bound its frugality ratio. We show that the solution quality is with a constant factor of optimal and the frugality ratio is within a constant factor of the best possible worst-case bound; this is the first auction for this problem to have these properties. Moreover, we show h...
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldber
Added 11 Dec 2010
Updated 11 Dec 2010
Type Journal
Year 2006
Where CORR
Authors Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg
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