MAGS
2010
12 years 11 months ago
2010
This paper analyzes sequential auctions for budget constrained bidders, for multiple heterogeneous common value objects. In most auctions, bidders not only have valuations for obj...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 2 months ago
2010
Springer
We study online profit-maximizing auctions for digital goods with adversarial bid selection and uniformly random arrivals. Our goal is to design auctions that are constant competit...
MOBIHOC
2010
ACM
13 years 2 months ago
2010
ACM
Dynamic spectrum auction is an effective solution to provide spectrum on-demand to many small wireless networks. As the number of participants grows, bidder collusion becomes a se...
IEEEARES
2010
IEEE
13 years 2 months ago
2010
IEEE
Online auctions of governmental bonds and CO2 certificates are challenged by high availability requirements in face of high peak loads around the auction deadline. Traditionally, t...
SEKE
2010
Springer
13 years 3 months ago
2010
Springer
In this paper, we are interested in the relationship between final prices of online auctions and possible shill activities during those auctions. We conduct experiments on real auc...
MANSCI
2010
13 years 3 months ago
2010
: Do firms neglect competition when making entry decisions? Using a dataset of 14,973 eBay auctions this paper addresses this question analyzing the time of day at which sellers se...
JAIR
2010
13 years 3 months ago
2010
We develop multiattribute auctions that accommodate generalized additive independent (GAI) preferences. We propose an iterative auction mechanism that maintains prices on potentia...
AAMAS
2002
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2002
Springer
An evolutionary approach to the problem of economic mechanism choice is presented. It demonstrates the power that a single participant has on the choice of a preferred market mecha...
JAIR
2007
13 years 4 months ago
2007
In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single commodity, such as a res...
AMAI
2005
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2005
Springer
We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. Well designed auctions can help to avoid unnecessary elicitation while determining efficient allocations...