Sciweavers

Share
TARK
2007
Springer

Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players

9 years 4 months ago
Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players
Most work in game theory assumes that players are perfect reasoners and have common knowledge of all significant aspects of the game. In earlier work [Halpern and Rˆego 2006], we proposed a framework for representing and analyzing games with possibly unaware players, and suggested a generalization of Nash equilibrium appropriate for games with unaware players that we called generalized Nash equilibrium. Here, we use this framework to analyze other solution concepts, with a focus on sequential equilibrium. We also provide some insight into the notion of generalized Nash equilibrium by proving that it is closely related to the notion of rationalizability when we restrict the analysis to games in normal form and no unawareness is involved.
Leandro Chaves Rêgo, Joseph Y. Halpern
Added 09 Jun 2010
Updated 09 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2007
Where TARK
Authors Leandro Chaves Rêgo, Joseph Y. Halpern
Comments (0)
books