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COLCOM
2008
IEEE

Incentive and Trust Issues in Assured Information Sharing

8 years 8 months ago
Incentive and Trust Issues in Assured Information Sharing
Assured information sharing among different organizations in a coalitional environment is an important first step in accomplishing many critical tasks. For example, different security agencies may need to share intelligence information for detecting terrorist plots. At the same, each organization participating in the assured information sharing process may have different incentives. In this paper, we explore the effects of different incentives and potential trust issues among organizations on the assured information sharing process by developing an evolutionary game theoretic framework. In addition, we provide extensive simulation analysis that illustrates the impact of various different information sharing strategies.
Ryan Layfield, Murat Kantarcioglu, Bhavani M. Thur
Added 29 May 2010
Updated 29 May 2010
Type Conference
Year 2008
Where COLCOM
Authors Ryan Layfield, Murat Kantarcioglu, Bhavani M. Thuraisingham
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