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SIGECOM
2006
ACM

Incentives engineering for structured P2P systems - a feasibility demonstration using economic experiments

12 years 3 months ago
Incentives engineering for structured P2P systems - a feasibility demonstration using economic experiments
Structured peer-to-peer systems allow to administer large volumes of data. Several peers collaborate to generate a query result. Analyses of unstructured peer-to-peer systems, namely of those for file-sharing, show that peers tend to shirk collaboration. We anticipate similar behavior in structured peer-to-peer systems. Recently, protocols to counter uncooperative behavior in such systems have been proposed. This article examines the behavior of peers under such protocols, using game theory. A first result of this paper is a set of hypotheses, e.g.: Peers answer queries if more than a certain percentage of their queries is answered. In many situations, free-riding does not lead to a break-down of the system. Trust, reciprocity and reputation building via a feedback mechanism are behavioral motives that increase cooperation. As a second step, we have conducted economic experiments with human participants to validate our predictions. Such experiments are important because we do not need...
Stephan Schosser, Klemens Böhm, Rainer Schmid
Added 14 Jun 2010
Updated 14 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2006
Where SIGECOM
Authors Stephan Schosser, Klemens Böhm, Rainer Schmidt, Bodo Vogt
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