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2008

Learning to Reach Agreement in a Continuous Ultimatum Game

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Learning to Reach Agreement in a Continuous Ultimatum Game
It is well-known that acting in an individually rational manner, according to the principles of classical game theory, may lead to sub-optimal solutions in a class of problems named social dilemmas. In contrast, humans generally do not have much difficulty with social dilemmas, as they are able to balance personal benefit and group benefit. As agents in multi-agent systems are regularly confronted with social dilemmas, for instance in tasks such as resource allocation, these agents may benefit from the inclusion of mechanisms thought to facilitate human fairness. Although many of such mechanisms have already been implemented in a multi-agent systems context, their applicausually limited to rather abstract social dilemmas with a discrete set of available strategies (usually two). Given that many real-world examples of social dilemmas are actually continuous in nature, we extend this previous work to more general dilemmas, in which agents operate in a continuous strategy space. The soci...
Steven de Jong, Simon Uyttendaele, Karl Tuyls
Added 12 Dec 2010
Updated 12 Dec 2010
Type Journal
Year 2008
Where JAIR
Authors Steven de Jong, Simon Uyttendaele, Karl Tuyls
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