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ATAL
2009
Springer

Manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures

8 years 11 months ago
Manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman who are not married to each other both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals to matching students to schools. A well-known algorithm to solve this problem is the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which runs in polynomial time. It has been proven that stable marriage procedures can always be manipulated. Whilst the Gale-Shapley algorithm is computationally easy to manipulate, we prove that there exist stable marriage procedures which are NP-hard to manipulate. We also consider the relationship between voting theory and stable marriage procedures, showing that voting rules which are NP-hard to manipulate can be used to define stable marriage procedures which are themselves NP-hard to manipulate. Finally, we consider the issue that stable marriage procedures like Gale-Shapley favour one gender over the ot...
Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent
Added 26 May 2010
Updated 26 May 2010
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where ATAL
Authors Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent Venable, Toby Walsh
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