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PKC
2009
Springer

Modeling Key Compromise Impersonation Attacks on Group Key Exchange Protocols

12 years 8 months ago
Modeling Key Compromise Impersonation Attacks on Group Key Exchange Protocols
A key exchange protocol allows a set of parties to agree upon a secret session key over a public network. Two-party key exchange (2PKE) protocols have been rigorously analyzed under various models considering different adversarial actions. However, the analysis of group key exchange (GKE) protocols has not been as extensive as that of 2PKE protocols. Particularly, the security attribute of key compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience has so far been ignored for the case of GKE protocols. We first model the security of GKE protocols addressing KCI attacks by both outsider and insider adversaries. We then show that a few existing protocols are not secure even against outsider KCI attacks. The attacks on these protocols demonstrate the necessity of considering KCI resilience for GKE protocols. Finally, we give a new proof of security for an existing GKE protocol under the revised model assuming random oracles. Keywords. Group Key Exchange, Key Compromise Impersonation, Insider Attacks.
Colin Boyd, Juan Manuel González Nieto, M.
Added 25 Nov 2009
Updated 25 Nov 2009
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where PKC
Authors Colin Boyd, Juan Manuel González Nieto, M. Choudary Gorantla
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