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FOCS
2008
IEEE

Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits

13 years 11 months ago
Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits
We study multi-unit auctions where the bidders have a budget constraint, a situation very common in practice that has received relatively little attention in the auction theory literature. Our main result is an impossibility: there are no incentive-compatible auctions that always produce a Pareto-optimal allocation. We also obtain some surprising positive results for certain special cases. JEL Classification Numbers: C70, D44, D82
Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan
Added 29 May 2010
Updated 29 May 2010
Type Conference
Year 2008
Where FOCS
Authors Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan
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