When autonomous agents decide on their bidding strategies in real world auctions, they have a number of concerns that go beyond the models that are normally analyzed in traditiona...
Abstract: The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (singl...
We present a novel algorithm for computing the optimal winning bids in a combinatorial auction (CA), that is, an auction in which bidders bid for bundles of goods. All previously ...
Kevin Leyton-Brown, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz
We study multi-unit auctions where the bidders have a budget constraint, a situation very common in practice that has received relatively little attention in the auction theory li...
Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the Vick...
Paul Harrenstein, Mathijs de Weerdt, Vincent Conit...