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SAGT
2009
Springer

A New Derandomization of Auctions

13 years 10 months ago
A New Derandomization of Auctions
Let A be a randomized, unlimited supply, unit demand, single-item auction, which given a bid-vector b ∈ [h]n , has expected profit E[P(b)]. Aggarwal et al. showed that given A, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector b, guarantees a profit of E[P(b)]/4 − O(h). In this paper we show that given A, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector b of length n, guarantees a profit of E[P(b)] − O(h √ n ln hn). As is the case with the construction of Aggarwal et al., our construction is not polynomial time computable.
Oren Ben-Zwi, Ilan Newman, Guy Wolfovitz
Added 27 May 2010
Updated 27 May 2010
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where SAGT
Authors Oren Ben-Zwi, Ilan Newman, Guy Wolfovitz
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