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CORR
2010
Springer

Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy

13 years 1 months ago
Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there exists an algorithm that finds the optimal randomized mechanism that runs in time polynomial in the size of the support. We leverage this result to show that in the oracle model introduced by Ronen and Saberi [FOCS'02], there exists a polynomial time truthful in expectation mechanism that provides a
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
Added 01 Mar 2011
Updated 01 Mar 2011
Type Journal
Year 2010
Where CORR
Authors Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
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