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» Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy
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CORR
2010
Springer
128views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 2 months ago
Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there...
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
INFOCOM
2011
IEEE
12 years 8 months ago
To preempt or not: Tackling bid and time-based cheating in online spectrum auctions
—Online spectrum auctions offer ample flexibility for bidders to request and obtain spectrum on-the-fly. Such flexibility, however, opens up new vulnerabilities to bidder mani...
Lara B. Deek, Xia Zhou, Kevin C. Almeroth, Haitao ...
IJCAI
2001
13 years 6 months ago
CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions where bidders can bid on bundles of items can lead to more economical allocations, but determining the winners is NP-complete and inapproximable. We present...
Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, Davi...
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
112views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
13 years 10 months ago
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm