Optimal social laws

11 years 6 months ago
Optimal social laws
Social laws have proved to be a powerful and theoretically elegant framework for coordination in multi-agent systems. Most existing models of social laws assume that a designer is attempting to produce a set of constraints on agent behaviour which will ensure that some single overall desirable objective is achieved. However, this represents a gross simplification of the typical situation, where a designer may have multiple (possibly conflicting) objectives, with different priorities. Moreover, social laws, as well as bringing benefits, also have implementation costs: imposing a social law often cannot be done at zero cost. We present a model of social laws that reflects this reality: it takes into account both the fact that the designer of a social law may have multiple differently valued objectives, and that the implementation of a social law is not costneutral. In this setting, designing a social law becomes an optimisation problem, in which a designer must take into account both th...
Thomas Ågotnes, Michael Wooldridge
Added 08 Nov 2010
Updated 08 Nov 2010
Type Conference
Year 2010
Where ATAL
Authors Thomas Ågotnes, Michael Wooldridge
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