Overcoming limitations of game-theoretic distributed control

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Overcoming limitations of game-theoretic distributed control
—Recently, game theory has been proposed as a tool for cooperative control. Specifically, the interactions of a multiagent distributed system are modeled as a non-cooperative game where agents are self-interested. In this work, we prove that this approach of non-cooperative control has limitations with respect to engineering multi-agent systems. In particular, we prove that it is not possible to design budget balanced agent utilities that also guarantee that the optimal control is a Nash equilibrium. However, it is important to realize that game-theoretic designs are not restricted to the framework of non-cooperative games. In particular, we demonstrate that these limitations can be overcome by conditioning each player’s utility on additional information, i.e., a state. This utility design fits into the framework of a particular form of stochastic games termed state-based games and is applicable in many application domains.
Jason R. Marden, Adam Wierman
Added 21 Jul 2010
Updated 21 Jul 2010
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where CDC
Authors Jason R. Marden, Adam Wierman
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