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2005
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The price of anarchy of finite congestion games

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The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
We consider the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games with linear latency functions. For asymmetric games, the price of anarchy of maximum social cost is ( N), where N is the number of players. For all other cases of symmetric or asymmetric games and for both maximum and average social cost, the price of anarchy is 5/2. We extend the results to latency functions that are polynomials of bounded degree. We also extend some of the results to mixed Nash equilibria.
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias
Added 03 Dec 2009
Updated 03 Dec 2009
Type Conference
Year 2005
Where STOC
Authors George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias
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