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ESA
2005
Springer

On the Price of Anarchy and Stability of Correlated Equilibria of Linear Congestion Games

10 years 4 months ago
On the Price of Anarchy and Stability of Correlated Equilibria of Linear Congestion Games
We consider the price of stability for Nash and correlated equilibria of linear congestion games. The price of stability is the optimistic price of anarchy, the ratio of the cost of the best Nash or correlated equilibrium over the social optimum. We show that for the sum social cost, which corresponds to the average cost of the players, every linear congestion game
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias
Added 27 Jun 2010
Updated 27 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2005
Where ESA
Authors George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias
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