Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions

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We formalize the deﬁnition of symmetric auctions to study fundamental properties of incentive compatible auction protocols. We characterize such auction protocols for those with a ﬁxed number of items to sell and study some important properties of those with an indeﬁnite number of sales.

Xiaotie Deng, Kazuo Iwama, Qi Qi, Aries Wei Sun, T

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Auction | Auction Protocols | COCOON 2007 | Compatible Auction Protocols |

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Added	07 Jun 2010
Updated	07 Jun 2010
Type	Conference
Year	2007
Where	COCOON
Authors	Xiaotie Deng, Kazuo Iwama, Qi Qi, Aries Wei Sun, Toyotaka Tasaka

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Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions

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