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EOR
2008

Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games

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Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games
This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players' decisions according to some optimality criterion. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the best choice problem are given. Several concepts of criteria for selecting a correlated equilibrium are used.
David M. Ramsey, Krzysztof Szajowski
Added 10 Dec 2010
Updated 10 Dec 2010
Type Journal
Year 2008
Where EOR
Authors David M. Ramsey, Krzysztof Szajowski
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