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2016

The Shapley value for directed graph games

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The Shapley value for directed graph games
The Shapley value for directed graph (digraph) games, TU games with limited cooperation introduced by an arbitrary digraph prescribing the dominance relation among the players, is introduced. It is defined as the average of marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all permutations that do not violate the subordination of players. We assume that in order to cooperate players may join only coalitions containing no players dominating them. Properties of this solution are studied and a convexity type condition is provided that guarantees its stability with respect to an appropriately defined core concept. An axiomatization for cycle digraph games for which the digraphs are directed cycles is obtained.
Anna B. Khmelnitskaya, Özer Selçuk, Do
Added 08 Apr 2016
Updated 08 Apr 2016
Type Journal
Year 2016
Where ORL
Authors Anna B. Khmelnitskaya, Özer Selçuk, Dolf Talman
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