Stability under Strategy Switching

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Stability under Strategy Switching
We suggest that a process-like notion of strategy is relevant in the context of interactions in systems of self-interested agents. In this view, strategies are not plans formulated by rational agents considering all possible futures and (mutually recursively) taking into account strategies employed by other players. Instead, they are partial; players start with a set of potential strategies and dynamically switch between them. This necessitates some means in the model for players to access each others’ strategies, and we suggest a syntax by which players’ rationale for such switching may be specified and structurally composed. In such a model one can ask a stability question: given a game arena and a strategy specification, whether players eventually settle down to strategies without further switching. We show that this problem can be algorithmically solved using automata theoretic methods.
Soumya Paul, Ramaswamy Ramanujam, Sunil Easaw Simo
Added 26 May 2010
Updated 26 May 2010
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where CIE
Authors Soumya Paul, Ramaswamy Ramanujam, Sunil Easaw Simon
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