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7

CORR
2002
Springer

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Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions

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Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions

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Daniel J. Lehmann, Liadan O'Callaghan, Yoav Shoham

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Added	18 Dec 2010
Updated	18 Dec 2010
Type	Journal
Year	2002
Where	CORR
Authors	Daniel J. Lehmann, Liadan O'Callaghan, Yoav Shoham

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