Sciweavers

Share
APPROX
2009
Springer

Truthful Mechanisms via Greedy Iterative Packing

10 years 8 months ago
Truthful Mechanisms via Greedy Iterative Packing
An important research thread in algorithmic game theory studies the design of efficient truthful mechanisms that approximate the optimal social welfare. A fundamental question is whether an α-approximation algorithm translates into an α-approximate truthful mechanism. It is well-known that plugging an α-approximation algorithm into the VCG technique may not yield a truthful mechanism. Hence, it is natural to investigate properties of approximation algorithms that enable their use in truthful mechanisms. The main contribution of this paper is to identify a useful and natural property of approximation algorithms, which we call loser-independence. Intuitively, a loser-independent algorithm does not change its outcome when the bid of a losing agent increases, unless that agent becomes a winner. We demonstrate that loser-independent algorithms can be employed as sub-procedures in a greedy iterative packing approach while preserving monotonicity. A greedy iterative approach provides good...
Chandra Chekuri, Iftah Gamzu
Added 25 May 2010
Updated 25 May 2010
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where APPROX
Authors Chandra Chekuri, Iftah Gamzu
Comments (0)
books