SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 5 months ago
2008
ACM
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
SODA
2004
ACM
13 years 6 months ago
2004
ACM
We consider the problem of picking (buying) an inexpensive s-t path in a graph where edges are owned by independent (selfish) agents, and the cost of an edge is known to its owner...
ESA
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2008
Springer
A truthful mechanism consists of an algorithm augmented with a suitable payment function which guarantees that the "players" cannot improve their utilities by "chea...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
13 years 9 months ago
2010
ACM
We study the problem of selling identical goods to n unit-demand bidders in a setting in which the total supply of goods is unknown to the mechanism. Items arrive dynamically, and...
FOCS
2003
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
2003
IEEE
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...
APPROX
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2004
Springer
In many economic settings, convex figures on the plane are for sale. For example, one might want to sell advertising space on a newspaper page. Selfish agents must be motivated ...
WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2007
Springer
We study the frugality ratio of truthful mechanisms in path auctions, which measures the extent to which truthful mechanisms “overpay” compared to non-truthful mechanisms. In p...
ISAAC
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2007
Springer
Most of the recent works on algorithmic mechanism design exploit the solution concept of dominant strategy equilibria. Such work designs a proper payment scheme so that selfish ag...
WINE
2009
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2009
Springer
We study the geometrical shape of the partitions of the input space created by the allocation rule of a truthful mechanism for multi-unit auctions with multidimensional types and ...
APPROX
2009
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2009
Springer
An important research thread in algorithmic game theory studies the design of efficient truthful mechanisms that approximate the optimal social welfare. A fundamental question is ...