We describe a faithful embedding of the Dolev-Yao model of Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner (CCS 2003) in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. This model is cryptographically sound in ...
Christoph Sprenger, Michael Backes, David A. Basin...
We develop a compositional method for proving cryptographically sound security properties of key exchange protocols, based on a symbolic logic that is interpreted over conventiona...
Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitchell, Bogdan...
Since the 1980s, two approaches have been developed for analyzing security protocols. One of the approaches relies on a computational model that considers issues of complexity and ...
Abstract. Parallel repetition is well known to reduce the error probability at an exponential rate for single- and multi-prover interactive proofs. Bellare, Impagliazzo and Naor (1...
d abstract) Prateek Gupta and Vitaly Shmatikov The University of Texas at Austin We present a cryptographically sound formal method for proving correctness of key exchange protoco...