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» A Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio of Truthful Auctions
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STACS
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
A Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio of Truthful Auctions
We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for a set of identical items. We adopt the worst case competitive framework defined by [1,2] that compares the profit of an ...
Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Kar...
WINE
2007
Springer
124views Economy» more  WINE 2007»
13 years 11 months ago
On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions
We study the frugality ratio of truthful mechanisms in path auctions, which measures the extent to which truthful mechanisms “overpay” compared to non-truthful mechanisms. In p...
Qiqi Yan
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
110views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
On random sampling auctions for digital goods
In the context of auctions for digital goods, an interesting Random Sampling Optimal Price auction (RSOP) has been proposed by Goldberg, Hartline and Wright; this leads to a truth...
Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian, Aravind Srinivasa...
CORR
2006
Springer
160views Education» more  CORR 2006»
13 years 5 months ago
Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover
In set-system auctions, there are several overlapping teams of agents, and a task that can be completed by any of these teams. The auctioneer's goal is to hire a team and pay...
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldber...
SODA
2003
ACM
121views Algorithms» more  SODA 2003»
13 years 6 months ago
Competitiveness via consensus
We introduce the following consensus estimate problem. Several processors hold private and possibly different lower bounds on a value. The processors do not communicate with each ...
Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline