7 search results - page 1 / 2 » A Mechanism for Multiple Goods and Interdependent Valuations |
AMEC
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2004
Springer
Abstract. This paper reports on the design of an auction mechanism for allocating multiple goods when the buyers have interdependent valuations. We cast the problem as a multi-agen...
JSAC
2008
13 years 4 months ago
2008
We study a sequential auction for sharing a wireless resource (bandwidth or power) among competing transmitters. The resource is assumed to be managed by a spectrum broker (auction...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2010
Springer
We investigate the problem of allocating items (private goods) among competing agents in a setting that is both prior-free and paymentfree. Specifically, we focus on allocating mu...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
13 years 9 months ago
2010
ACM
The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the expected revenue of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good ...
SODA
2010
ACM
14 years 2 months ago
2010
ACM
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budg...