This paper develops a new combinatorial auction protocol called the Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation (GM-SMA). This protocol satisfies the following characteristics:...
Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among ...
We consider the following allocation problem arising in the setting of combinatorial auctions: a set of goods is to be allocated to a set of players so as to maximize the sum of t...
Subhash Khot, Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markaki...
We consider the problem of allocating networked resources in dynamic environment, such as cloud computing platforms, where providers strategically price resources to maximize thei...
Bo An, Victor R. Lesser, David Irwin, Michael Zink
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can bid on bundles of items are known to be desirable auction mechanisms for selling items that are complementary and/or substitutable. Howev...