We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains bot...
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Angelina ...
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
Abstract. We study the problem of designing group-strategyproof costsharing mechanisms. The players report their bids for getting serviced and the mechanism decides a set of player...
Performance of various functions of the tissue structure depends on porous scaffold microstructures with specific porosity characteristics that influence the behavior of the incor...
— This paper presents the development of a biomechatronic knee prosthesis for transfemoral amputees. This kind of prostheses are considered ‘intelligent’ because they are abl...