52 search results - page 1 / 11 » Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design |
STOC
2005
ACM
14 years 5 months ago
2005
ACM
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2005
ACM
The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...
JCSS
2008
13 years 5 months ago
2008
We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a broad class of re...
APPROX
2009
Springer
13 years 12 months ago
2009
Springer
An important research thread in algorithmic game theory studies the design of efficient truthful mechanisms that approximate the optimal social welfare. A fundamental question is ...
FOCS
2005
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
2005
IEEE
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also bounds ...