It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that player...
We consider a multicast game with selfish non-cooperative players. There is a special source node and each player is interested in connecting to the source by making a routing de...
Chandra Chekuri, Julia Chuzhoy, Liane Lewin-Eytan,...
The PPAD-completeness of Nash equilibrium computation is taken as evidence that the problem is computationally hard in the worst case. This evidence is necessarily rather weak, in ...
We introduce a new class of games, congestion games with failures (CGFs), which extends the class of congestion games to allow for facility failures. In a basic CGF (BCGF) agents ...
We propose a simple and intuitive cost mechanism which assigns costs for the competitive usage of m resources by n selfish agents. Each agent has an individual demand; demands are...
Marios Mavronicolas, Panagiota N. Panagopoulou, Pa...