Imagine a set of self-interested clients, each of whom must choose a server from a permissible set. A server’s latency is inversely proportional to its speed, but it grows linear...
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for loa...
We investigate the price of anarchy of a load balancing game with K dispatchers. The service rates and holding costs are assumed to depend on the server, and the service disciplin...
We study the impact of collusion in network games with splittable flow and focus on the well established price of anarchy as a measure of this impact. We first investigate symmet...
We consider the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games with linear latency functions. For asymmetric games, the price of anarchy of maximum social cost is ( ...