205 search results - page 2 / 41 » Elections Can be Manipulated Often |
AAAI
2012
11 years 8 months ago
2012
In many mechanisms (especially online mechanisms), a strategic agent can influence the outcome by creating multiple false identities. We consider voting settings where the mechan...
CORR
2002
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2002
Springer
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal r...
ECAI
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2010
Springer
Abstract. Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Agents may try to manipulate the result of voting by mis-reporting their preferences....
AAAI
2010
13 years 3 months ago
2010
We consider the problem of manipulating elections via cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator can replace each candidate c by one or more clones, i.e., new candidates that...
SIAMCOMP
2011
12 years 8 months ago
2011
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-dictatorial election rule among at least three alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative versi...