Sciweavers

15 search results - page 2 / 3
» Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and ...
Sort
View
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
False-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol: Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation
This paper develops a new combinatorial auction protocol called the Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation (GM-SMA). This protocol satisfies the following characteristics:...
Makoto Yokoo, Toshihiro Matsutani, Atsushi Iwasaki
SAGT
2009
Springer
118views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem
Roberts’ theorem from 1979 states that the only incentive compatible mechanisms over a full domain and range of at least 3 are weighted variants of the VCG mechanism termed affin...
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
ECWEB
2003
Springer
151views ECommerce» more  ECWEB 2003»
13 years 10 months ago
A Combinatorial Exchange for Autonomous Traders
Abstract. Combinatorial exchanges have attracted much attention recently. However, to this point there is no generally accepted payment allocation algorithm capable of clearing com...
Andreas Tanner, Gero Mühl
CORR
2008
Springer
111views Education» more  CORR 2008»
13 years 5 months ago
Fairness in Combinatorial Auctioning Systems
One of the Multi-Agent Systems that is widely used by various government agencies, buyers and sellers in a market economy, in such a manner so as to attain optimized resource allo...
Megha Saini, Shrisha Rao
ATAL
2003
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Generalizing preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm