This paper proposes a new type of cache-collision timing attacks on software implementations of AES. Our major technique is of differential nature and is based on the internal cryp...
Andrey Bogdanov, Thomas Eisenbarth, Christof Paar,...
Side-channel based collision attacks are a mostly disregarded alternative to DPA for analyzing unprotected implementations. The advent of strong countermeasures, such as masking, h...
In this work, we apply the rebound attack to the AES based SHA-3 candidate Lane. The hash function Lane uses a permutation based compression function, consisting of a linear messag...
This work describes a hardware approach for the concurrent fault detection and error correction in a cryptographic core. It has been shown in the literature that transient faults ...
Side-channel attacks are nowadays a serious concern when implementing cryptographic algorithms. Powerful ways for gaining information about the secret key as well as various count...
Francesco Regazzoni, Thomas Eisenbarth, Luca Breve...